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Abstract—In general, the functions provided by complex 
systems often involve multiple sub-systems and components that 
are functionally dependent on each other. The dependency could 
be to receive power, control signals, input data, memory storage, 
feedback etc. With the increasing use of electronic systems to 
perform critical functions, the potential for malfunctions due to 
electromagnetic interference need to be identified and 
mitigated. Hence, a risk analysis, estimating the likelihood and 
severity of electromagnetic interference effects, is desirable 
from the very early stages of system development. In this paper, 
the use of probabilistic graphical models for estimating the 
likelihood of electromagnetic disturbances causing system 
malfunctions with various degrees of severity is demonstrated 
using a very simple case study. Statistical data are synthesised 
to illustrate the construction of conditional probability 
distribution tables for a Bayesian Network system model. 
Factorization and inference techniques are then applied to 
demonstrate the formulation and answer of queries that could 
be of value during system risk assessment.  
Keywords— risk analysis, probabilistic graphical models, 
Bayesian network, failure analysis, electromagnetic interference. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the current practice of electromagnetic compatibility 
(EMC) in relation to road vehicles, the immunity testing 
conditions (i.e. frequency range and steps, field strength, 
exposure time, illumination direction, operational state etc.) 
are prescribed by regulatory standards. Some manufactures 
verify the immunity of their systems at more stringent levels 
for higher confidence. However, due to technical and 
economic limitations, it is impossible to test all possible 
electromagnetic interference conditions, resulting in an 
insufficiency of confidence due to epistemic uncertainties (i.e. 
things that could be known in principle, but in practice are 
not). 
To achieve EMC for modern complex systems with rapid 
advancement in the features and functionality (like automated 
driving in road vehicles), the current industrial practice of 
rule-based EMC testing approach needs to be shifted, more 
towards a risk-based approach. As also discussed in [1], in 
order to accomplish a risk-based electromagnetic (EM) 
approach, hazards identification and risk estimation activities 
should commence from the initial concept phase of the system 
itself, and should be continuously refined as more and more 
system knowledge is obtained.  
In [2], some of the risk factors to be considered to 
determine the risk parameters (likelihood and severity) for a 
system-level EM risk analysis are given. This includes 
estimation of the likelihood of EM interference (EMI) having 
an impact with a particular severity level for any system 
function, reflecting the functional dependence or interaction 
between the various components that are involved. The level 
of risk then depends on the severity of the consequences and 
the likelihood of their occurrence [3]. In this paper, the 
application of a probabilistic graphical model (PGM) for EMI 
risk analysis is illustrated by considering EMI to be a 
common-cause of failure for multiple components performing 
a system function. This analysis is carried out using a 
Bayesian network (BN) [4]. The significant increase in the 
application of BN models for risk analysis and dependability 
for complex systems is evident from [5]. However, there is 
very little literature on the application of PGMs for EM risk 
analysis considering EM interference to be a common-cause 
failures and cascading failures [6]. 
This paper provides a simple demonstration of system-
level EMI risk estimation with PGMs, using a case study 
consisting of functionally dependent components as discussed 
in Section II. Further, the details of the EMI analysis 
procedure and results obtained for the impact analysis and risk 
estimation are given in Section III-IV. Integration of the 
simulation results to construct the conditional probability 
distribution (CPD) tables of the Bayesian network model and 
relevant inferences obtained therefrom are discussed in 
Section V. The merits and limitations of PGMs for EM risk 
analysis are summarised in Section VI. Finally, the 
conclusions and related future work are summarized in the last 
section. In addition, the Appendix provides some further 
details of derivation of the EMI probability distributions. 
II. SIMPLE CASE STUDY  
A complex system usually employs more than one 
component or subsystem (comprising sensors, controllers and 
actuators) to perform a system function. EMI that is present in 
the system environment can cause malfunctions by affecting 
more than one component, resulting in a common-cause 
failure. Additionally, due to functional dependence, any 
erroneous signal provided by one component/subsystem could 
be further passed to its dependent components/subsystems, 
causing much severe consequences at a system level [7]. 
For the purposes of this study, it is imagined that a hazard 
analysis has been carried out and a critical system function has 
been identified that depends on particular data signals that are 
at risk from possible corruption by EMI. Although errors of 
up to 20% in value of the parameter carried by these signals 
are tolerable, differences of 20–60% would be a nuisance and 
anything more than 60% is considered to be unacceptable. In 
order to assess the associated risk, it would be desirable to 
estimate the probability of EMI-induced errors reaching the 
identified severity levels. 
The research leading to these results has received funding from the 
European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under 
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The critical data is assumed to be processed by a simple 
sub-system comprised of components C1 and C2 (for data 
transmission), and subsystems S1 and S2 (data processing) as 
shown in Fig. 1, is taken as an example to apply the BN model 
for analysing the likelihood of common-cause and cascaded 
failures due to EMI. The system model is based on the 
assumptions below. 
 The system function is to deliver a pulse width 
modulated (PWM) representation of a sinusoid of 
frequency F to subsystem S2, where F is initially 
supplied as a digital signal to C1.  
 Any deviation to the frequency of the sinusoidal wave 
reconstructed from the PWM wave by S2 is considered 
a malfunction.  
 Subsystem S1 receives a numerical value transmitted 
via cable C1 in the form of a digital signal m1.  
 A sinusoidal signal with frequency equal to the 
received numerical value is then converted to a PWM 
wave m2 by S1 and transmitted through C2 to 
subsystem S2.  
 For the purposes of this case study, S1 and S2 are 
assumed to be immune to the EMI applied for the 
analysis, whereas C1 and C2 are both considered to be 
potentially susceptible to the EMI. 
Component C2 is therefore functionally dependent on C1, 
as the frequency of the PWM signal transmitted through C2 is 
based on the value received by S1 from C1.  
Assuming PWM modulation and demodulation functions 
denoted by Pwm(mj) and Ipwm(mj), respectively, are applied 
to a signal mj, then the modulated signal m2 = Pwm(m1) 
corresponds to a sinusoid of frequency F if C1 is unaffected 
by EMI. Furthermore, if C2 is also unaffected by EMI then the 
demodulated signal Ipwm(m2) has a frequency equal to F. 
However, if either or both signals are affected by EMI then a 
malfunction, where Ipwm(m2)  F, is a possible outcome. 
III. LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION FOR EMI 
To emulate the susceptibility of C1 and C2 to EMI noise, 
continuous sinusoids of the form Nk = Aksin(2𝜋fkt + φk) were 
added to the cable signals m1 and m2. A total of 6262 random 
noise samples were derived, with uniform distributions over 
the ranges allocated for the amplitude Ak (1 to 1.5 V), the 
frequency fk (15 kHz to 0.3 MHz), and the initial phase 
φk (0 to 2𝜋 radians) of the noise. 
A. Generating Signals for C1 and C2 
 The signals m1 and m2 that are transmitted through cables 
C1 and C2, respectively, are generated as outlined below. 
1. The intended target value, F, is converted to a digital 
signal in binary format (0 = –1 V and 1= +1 V), with 
a bit rate of 100 kbits/sec. For a target value F=150, 
the digital input to cable C1 corresponds to 
10010110. 
2. Where required, EMI may be added to the signal m1. 
3. Using an intersective method (a sawtooth waveform 
was used as the modulating waveform), a PWM 
pulse train is constructed as the input to C2, 
corresponding to a sinusoidal signal with frequency 
equal to the value (in kHz) received by subsystem S1 
in the form of m1 .  
4. Where required, EMI may be added to the signal m2. 
5. The PWM pulse train that is transmitted via C2 is 
demodulated by S2 to retrieve the frequency of the 
sinusoid represented by m2.  
Signals were generated for three EMI conditions, with 
EMI applied individually to m1 (denoted E1) and m2 (E2), as 
well as applied to both m1 and m2 concurrently (E3). 
B. Probability of Malfunction 
If the frequency decoded by S2 under EMI condition En is 
Gk (En), then the corresponding relative deviation Dk (En) from 
the target value F is obtained from:  
𝐷 (𝐸 ) =  100
𝐺 (𝐸 ) − 𝐹
𝐹
(%) (1) 
The decoded frequency values Gk(En) were obtained by 
selecting the highest peak (Pk) of the Fourier transform (Ft) of 
the signal demodulated by S2 for the three potential EMI 
conditions: 
𝐺 (𝐸 ) = Pk{Ft[Ipwm{Pwm(𝑚 + 𝑁 )}]} (2) 
𝐺 (𝐸 ) = Pk{Ft[Ipwm{Pwm(𝑚 ) + 𝑁 }]} (3) 
𝐺 (𝐸 ) = Pk{Ft[Ipwm{Pwm(𝑚 + 𝑁 ) + 𝑁 }]} (4) 
The results of relative deviations due to EMI in C1 (2), C2 
(3), and C1 and C2 concurrently (4) were obtained by adding 
the 6262 EM noise samples for each of the three cases. The 
data collected was used to generate the cumulative distribution 
functions (CDFs) for EMI that are illustrated in Fig. 2, for 
EMI in C1, in C2, and in both C1 and C2 concurrently 
(denoted C1&C2). Details of the corruption of the signals m1 
and m2 due to EMI are not key to the focus of this paper and 
are therefore explained in more detail in the Appendix, with 
relevant examples. 
 
Fig. 1 System model considered for casestudy: sub-system S1 transmits 
input data (digital) through cable C1, which is processed by sub-system S2 
to provide the output data (PWM wave) through cable C2. 
 
 Cumulative distribution functions for the deviations Dk (En) due 
to EMI noise in C1, C2 and C1&C2. 
IV. SEVERITY OF EMI IMPACT AND RISK 
To enable estimation of the system level risk associated 
with the EMI, the relative deviation caused by the EMI is 
assumed to have varying levels of severity of consequences. 
Hence, based on the magnitude of the relative deviation, D 
(%) from the intended target value, the severity S of the 
possible malfunctions is categorized as, low (tolerable), 
medium (undesirable) or high (intolerable) according to:  




   
 if  0 ≤ 𝐷 ≤ 20
   if  20 < 𝐷 ≤ 60
 if  𝐷 > 60         
 (5) 
Probability values for the severity levels (low, medium or 
high) associated with EMI effects on C1, C2, and C1&C2 are 
given in Table I. A comparison of these probabilities shows 
that it is highly likely that the EMI considered here will be of 
low severity for the system function by affecting components 
C1 and C2 independently, with the result that the associated 
risk levels are also low, given that the estimated probabilities 
for low severity impacts are very high: P (C1 = low) = 0.9784 
and P (C2 = low) = 0.9562 (see Table I).  
From a component supplier’s perspective, having such 
low risks might seem to be acceptable at first sight. However, 
it should be noted that the probability for having the low 
severity outcome for the C1&C2 situation P (C1&C2 = low) 
is smaller. This implies that, at a system-level, there is an 
increase in the likelihood of system malfunctions with medium 
and high severity, due to the functional dependence of 
components C1 and C2 (although in this particular example 
the increase is relatively small). 
V. EMI RISK ESTIMATION WITH BN 
For complex systems exploiting a high proportion of 
electrical and electronic components to perform system 
functions, EMI could be a common-cause of malfunctions or 
failures. The estimation of risk for such systems (i.e. 
determining the likelihood and severity of the EMI impacts) 
becomes increasingly difficult as the number of system 
functions when using more traditional tools (such as failure 
mode and effects analysis, fault trees, event trees etc.), , 
system components, and component failure modes increases. 
In this section, the application of EM risk analysis with BN (a 
PGM) is illustrated for the simple case study considered in this 
paper. 
A BN is a graphical structure consisting of a network of 
nodes representing model variables and edges representing a 
causal relationship between pairs of connected nodes. The 
functional dependence between components can be 
considered as a causal factor in determining the likelihood of 
impacts at a particular level of severity for the system 
function. Considering the simple case study reported here, it 
is possible to represent the functional dependence of C2 on C1 
in delivering the system function by using the BN graph and 
its associated conditional probability tables (CPDs), which are 
illustrated in Fig. 3. 
A. CPD Table Entries for BN Nodes  
The estimated probability values in the CPD tables for BN 
shown in Fig. 3 were obtained by analysing the statistical data 
outlined in section III. As component C1 does not have any 
parent nodes, the probability distribution of P(C1) is 
independent of any other node variables (i.e. C1 is not 
dependent on any other component within the system to 
perform the system function). Hence, P(C1) is not conditional 
on any other node variable and is directly obtained from Table 
I. However, C2 is dependent on its parent node C1 and is 
therefore conditioned on the state space assigned to the node 
variable C1. 
In Fig. 4, an event tree is used to illustrate the steps 
followed in determining the values of CPD table P (C2 | C1) 
for node C2 in Fig. 3. It should be noted that, among the 6262 
simulated noise samples initially considered for determining 
the CPD of EMI impact P(C2 | C1), only the specific event 
P(C2 = low | C1 = high) was never observed. Assigning zero 
probability for a rare but possible event only because it was 
not observed in a samples study would be unacceptable due to 
its impact on related probability values. In order to overcome 
this situation, a Bayesian approach to estimate the probability 
using equivalent sample size is given in [9]. For the case study, 
no prior knowledge is available to determine the required 
sample size to observe this event and its probability can only 
be quantified as <1/6262. To avoid the ambiguity of assigning 
a zero-probability value to a possible event, it is assumed that 
it would be observed if noise sample 6263 were to be 
generated (an indication of the additional sample is given by 
the red circles in Fig. 4).  
The CPD values of node C2 in the BN provides the 
likelihood of system level impact due to EM susceptibility of 
component C2, given each state space of the node variable C1. 
For instance, if the EM noise affecting component C1 caused 
a medium level impact, then the probability that the impact is 
high due to EM susceptibility of C2 is approximately 4% (see 
Fig. 3).  
B. Joint Probability of EMI Impact Severity 
 As previously given in [2], if all the nodes of a BN are 
responsible for a system-level function, then the overall 
probability for the functional deviation at system-level can be 
determined from their joint probability distribution (JPD). In 
this case study, both nodes (C1 and C2) in Fig. 3 are assigned 
 
 Simple BN representation of the functional dependence between 
components C1 and C2 as a causal factor to determine the probability of 
the degree of EMI impact on system function. Conditional distribution 
tables for EMI impact on C1 and C2 | C1 are given for nodes C1 and C2. 
TABLE I.  PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION TABLE FOR SEVERITY OF 
EMI IMPACT FOR C1, C2, AND C1&C2 
 low medium high 
C1 0.978441 0.012137 0.009422 
C2 0.956244 0.021559 0.022197 
C1&C2 0.944267 0.023315 0.032418 
 
to perform the system-level function, hence the overall 
probability measure of system-level impact can be determined 
from their JPD, which is given by: 
𝑃(𝐶1, 𝐶2)  =  𝑃(𝐶1|𝑝𝑎{𝐶2}) 𝑃(𝐶2|𝑝𝑎{𝐶2}) (6) 
where the function pa(X) represents the parents of a node 
variable X. 
 The factorization for the JPD is based on the independence 
properties obtained from the BN structure and the chain rule 
for the PGMs [9]. In this case study, pa(C1) = ∅ (i.e. the 
empty set) and pa(C2) = C1. In real-world systems there 
could be several components with functional dependencies 
that collectively implement a single system function. In such 
cases the BN might consist of several nodes and edges. 
Relevant examples of factorization for a BN with more than 
two nodes is given in [1], [8]. The JPD table for all possible 
state spaces for node variables C1 and C2 is provided in 
Table II. 
C. Bayesian Inference and Queries 
 One of the main applications of BN in risk analysis is the 
ability to estimate the likelihood of various queries, as more 
evidence is available [8]. A possible query for the BN of the 
case study model could be “What is the probability of an 
intolerable (high) impact on the system due to EMI effects on 
C2, given that the EMI effects on C1 are tolerable (low)?”. 
Using conditional probability, this query can be expressed as: 
𝑃(𝐶2 = ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ|𝐶1 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤)  =  
𝑃(𝐶1, 𝐶2 )
𝑃(𝐶1)
=  0.023 (7) 
Further inference queries related to either a single node 
variable or to a specific group of node variables in the BN can 
be answered by the method of marginalization, which is also 
known as sum-product variable elimination [4]. For the case 
study, the query “What is the probability of a tolerable (low) 
impact on the system due to EMI effects on C2?” can be 
obtained by marginalizing P(C2 = low), i.e., by performing a 
summation of all values corresponding to the JPD column 
C2 = low in Table II.  
The JPD table values are actually the product of terms 
given in (6). The marginal probabilities of C2 = low, 
C2 = medium, and C2 = high are obtained as follows: 
𝑃(𝐶1) 𝑃(𝐶2 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤|𝐶1) = 0.944276 (8) 
𝑃(𝐶1) 𝑃(𝐶2 = 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚|𝐶1) = 0.025227 (9) 
𝑃(𝐶1) 𝑃(𝐶2 = ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ|𝐶1) = 0.030496 (10) 
It can be seen that the independent probability values 
P(C2) given in Table I and the marginal probability values for 
P(C2) obtained from the Bayesian inference of (8)–(10) are 
different. This is because the latter consider the functional 
dependence of C2 on C1, facilitated by the BN. Since the case 
study has just two nodes in the BN model, the inferences are 
quick and do not necessarily need thorough mathematical 
formalization. In practice, however, for more realistic systems 
with multiple components and component failure states, a 
similar BN would have many nodes and edges, resulting in an 
exponential increase in the order of the JPD. 
In such cases, some subexpressions in the joint distribution 
that need be estimated for specific probability queries depend 
on a small number of variables, according to the 
independencies provided by the BN structure [4], [7] . Other 
inference techniques such as maximum a posteriori (MAP) 
inference can be further used during the risk management 
process to find the single highest probability. In the current 
analysis, a MAP query could be “What is the probability value 
for the most likely impact severity class due to EMI effects on 
C2 given that EMI effects on C1’s are intolerable?”. From the 
CPD table of Fig. 3 for node C2, it can be seen that the highest 
probability value given that C1 is high is 0.78, which occurs 
when C2 is also high. The mathematical formulation of MAP 
queries for complex system is described in [4]. 
VI. MERITS AND LIMITATIONS OF PGMS IN RISK ANALYSIS 
Risk analysis for complex systems (including road 
vehicles, aircraft, ships etc.) involves multiple system 
functions, components and failure states. For such systems, 
risk analysis with PGMs like BN and Markov Random 
Fields [10] provide better handling of the system complexity, 
through graphical visualization of the system 
components/subsystems together with their functional 
dependence in a single model.  
Some of the advantages of using PGMs over the traditional 
risk analysis tools such as event tree analysis (ETA) and fault 
tree analysis (FTA), for risk estimation include the following.  
1) The structures of fault trees and event trees are 
unidirectional, with the result that analysing common cause 
failures with bidirectional functional dependencies between 
 
 An event tree to illustrate the condition probability values 
obatained for the CPD table in Fig. 3. 
TABLE II.  JOINT PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION TABLE FOR SEVERITY 
OF EMI IMPACT FOR C1 AND C2 
P(C1, C2) C2 = low C2 = medium C2 = high 
C1 = low 0.942839 0.012933 0.022513 
C1 = medium 0.001277 0.010378 0.000479 
C1 = high 0.00016 0.001916 0.007504 
 
components would require multiple tree structures for a single 
system. Using PGMs, however, bidirectional functional 
dependencies can be represented in a single system model. 
2) Compact representations of complex distributions, 
mathematical formalizations for inference tasks, and software 
tools for PGM realization, can support the decision-making 
process by making these process be more efficient and less 
time consuming. 
3) Other technical and non-technical aspects relating to a 
component that may influence its EM susceptibility (such as 
component location within the system, shielding effects due 
to surrounding structures, EMI detection measures etc.) may 
also be added as additional nodes to the PGM structure. 
Further details on this are provided in [8]. 
The limitations of BN include modelling and computing 
difficulties as the number of parents associated with any single 
node in the model increases. For example, if a component X 
depends on ten other components or node variables, then the 
CPD table for node X would have 210 = 1024 entries. This 
would be a difficult task for an expert to perform, without 
access to sufficient data. In such cases, however, possibility 
theory or fuzzy logic could be employed to assign the CPD 
values [1]. Also, BNs belong to a class of PGMs having 
directed acyclic graph structures. Thus, BNs are unable to 
represent functional dependencies involving feedback loops. 
A possible solution to this limitation is to employ another class 
of PGMs called Markov random fields, which are graphs with 
undirected cyclic structure [10], thereby permitting feedback 
loop type dependencies. Another potential solution (although 
with increased complexity) is to employ dynamic BNs, which 
are temporal PGMs, modelled in time-slices [4].  
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
For complex systems, estimating the risk of EMI impact 
on the system functions involves considerable epistemic 
uncertainty arising from the lack of detailed system 
knowledge. Moreover, EMI being a common cause of failure, 
it can simultaneously affect more than one component or 
subsystem, with the potential to cause even more severe 
system-level consequences due to the functional dependence 
between the affected components and/or subsystems.  
In this paper, representative probabilistic data relating to 
EMI impact was generated using very simple methods in order 
to allow the CPD entries for a very simple BN model to be 
constructed for the case study outlined in Section II. In 
practice, however, such data could be derived from more 
realistic and detailed physical measurements or numerical 
simulations, or a mix of measurements and simulations. 
This synthetic data allowed the identification of the 
severity of the system-level consequences, and hence 
estimation of the EMI-related risk, to be illustrated for a very 
simple system with some functional dependence. In addition, 
this data allowed the demonstration of various inference 
techniques that could be used to formulate and answer 
probability queries that would help to support system risk 
assessments.  
Future work will further extend and develop the use of 
PGMs for system risk analysis, such as combining data 
obtained from measurements and/or simulations with the 
influence of non-technical factors on the key risk parameters 
(likelihood and severity). In addition, related automotive 
applications, such as communications system performance, 
will be investigated using this type of analysis.  
APPENDIX – GENERATION OF STATISTICAL DATA 
Firstly, it should be noted that the EMI probability 
distributions used in this work reflect neither the detailed 
physics of EMI nor the practical methods used to mitigate 
EMI effects, both of which are outside the scope of this paper. 
The results described here are purely synthetic and solely for 
the purposes of providing a representative source of statistical 
data for illustrating the use of PGM methods that are the 
subject of this paper. 
Determining the likelihood of EMI in components C1 and 
C2 having a particular severity of system level impact 
involves determining the probability and magnitude of the 
deviation from the intended output due to EMI noise in signals 
m1 and m2. This Appendix details of details the determination 
of Gk(E1) and Gk(E2) that are used for calculating the relative 
deviations Dk(E1) and Dk(E2) of Section III.B with reference 
to a specific target value, F = 150, and with a particular EMI 
noise example Na (with amplitude 1.38 V, frequency 20.58 
kHz and phase 5.5 radians) affecting C1 and/or C2. 
A. EMI Condition E1 (m1 + Na)  
Addition of noise to signal m1 (i.e. affecting C1 only) is 
considered as the first potential EMI condition, E1 (see Section 
III.B). In practice it is not actually necessary to include the 
PWM modulation and demodulation as indicated in (2) since 
it is assumed that C2 is not affected by EMI in this case. 
The digital signal m1, obtained by converting the target 
value F = 150 to a rectangular pulse-train in binary format 
corresponding to ‘10010110’ as shown by the input in 
Fig. 5(a). The noise signal Na is then simply added to the 
(a) 
   
(b) 
 Original and corrupted signals (due to noise sample Na) for EMI 
conditions (a) E1 and (b) E2. 
signal m1 to obtain the input + Noise waveform in Fig. 5(a). It 
can be observed that the addition of noise completely disrupts 
the intended signal. Nevertheless, for the purpose of 
calculating the deviation, the noisy signal was assumed to be 
reconstructed and decoded at S1. To reconstruct the noisy 
signal, the mean amplitude value over one-bit time interval 
(10–5 s) is compared to 0 V. If the mean > 0 V then the bit 
value is +1 V, otherwise it is considered to be –1 V. The 
reconstructed 8-bit signal for (Na + m1) is ‘11000110’ which 
corresponds to a decimal value of 198. So, for this example, 
using (1), the relative deviation Da(E1) from the intended 
target value (150) is 32%. 
B. EMI Condition E2 (m1 + Na) 
Similarly, to condition E1, the addition of noise to PWM 
signal m2 (modulated based on a sinusoid of target frequency 
150) is considered as the second EMI condition E2. The steps 
to calculate of the deviation from target frequency is given 
below: 
1) Generate a sinusoid of frequency F = 150 kHz and then 
convert it into a PWM signal m2 = Pwm(150), shown 
in Fig. 6(a). 
2) Add noise Na to signal m2, as illustrated in Fig. 6(b). 
3) Demodulate the corrupted signal (Na + m2) to obtain 
the demodulated signal Ipwm(Na + m2), which is 
shown in Fig. 6(c). 
4) Estimate the sinusoidal signal from the demodulated 
noisy PWM signal (Na + m2) by selecting the highest 
peak from the Fourier transform of the demodulated 
signal Ipwm(Na + m2). 
5) Determine the difference between the frequency value 
obtained from this process and the original target 
frequency of 150 kHz. 
For this example, the noise waveform (Na) yields a 
relative deviation Da(E2) = 0. 
C. EMI condition E3 (E1 + E2) 
In EMI condition E3, condition E1 is first applied to 
signal m1 and then the decoded value is subjected to PWM 
modulation before the application of EMI condition E2. 
The resulting difference Da(E3) is then obtained from the 
peak of the Fourier transform of the demodulated signal 
received at S2, as indicated in (4). 
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Fig. 6. Example plots to illustrate steps considered in EMI condition E2: 
(a) target frequency F and Pwm(F) waveform; (b) noise Na and waveform 
Pwm(F)+Na; and (c) demodulated noisy waveform Ipwm(Pwm(F)+Na) 
